In emerging economies like India, the weak institutional environment prevents evolution of closely held companies into widely firms which often leads to agency conflicts between insider shareholders (i.e., founder controlling shareholders or promoters) and outsider shareholders (i.e., institutional investors). The alignment and entrenchment incentives of promoters drive their influence on corporate outcomes while the influence of institutional investors on corporate outcomes could depend on whether they take up an active monitoring role or a passive monitoring role or collude with the management. Moreover, the joint influence of these two classes of shareholders has not yet been studied. Therefore, I investigate how controlling owners and institutional investors jointly affect the following corporate outcomes in an emerging market context: value relevance of IFRS convergence, stock price crash risk, and pledging risk. First, I investigate whether promoters affect the IFRS impact as there is no precedent for the role of founder ownership in influencing the value relevance of IFRS convergence. Further, I also investigate if institutional investors influence this relationship. Next, institutional investors are known for promoting better governance, by virtue of their size and expertise and hence are expected to reduce crash risk. Since institutional investors are a diverse group with differing incentives, the impact of institutional investors on crash risk is examined. Lastly, I investigate whether ownership structure mitigates the risk associated with controlling shareholder pledging, which is a popular practice in emerging economies. While it has been found that soft budget constraints associated with state ownership mitigate pledging risk, it is not known whether other ownership dynamics related to institutional investors and controlling shareholders reduce pledging risk. Therefore, I explore whether ownership dynamics related to institutional investors and promoters reduce pledging risk in India.